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SUMMARY
This paper sums up the ideas of the great
figures in the international literature of de-
velopment economics.
There are three main trends in the
theory of development economics. (1) The
reform trend, which is more closely con-
nected with the Keynesian background, em-
phasizes the way international conditions
generate inequality and therefore need to be
reformed in the end, while (2) some of the
representatives of the New Left habitually
use Marxist rhetoric, but place their argu-
ments on a Keynesian basis, saying that the
inequality of international exchange could
be terminated by reducing wage differen-
tials between the developed and underde-
veloped world. (3) The neo-Marxists em-
phasize the inequality-producing effect of
international ownership conditions, the
unequal exchange, monopoly prices and
other factors, but they do not consider that
the existing international economic condi-
tions can simply be reformed. The various
trends in development economics agree that
a very strong and effective economic-policy
contribution by the state is needed. In this
respect, their opinions resemble those of the
expansion school and neo-Keynesianism,
but they call for even more active state in-
tervention, at least in less developed coun-
tries.
Like the Keynesian-based concepts in
general, development theory went on the
defensive in the 1970s. However, the period
of 15–20 years in which liberal-orthodox
development theories and the dependency
schools dominated have become up-to-date
again in some respects. After the 1980s,
which were a lost decade for most countries
in the developing world, the structuralist
description of the world system as a hierar-
chical structure came to the fore again.
However, the structuralism of the 1990s
differed from its forerunner in many re-
spects and became known as neo-
structuralism.
From the geographical and historical
aspect, this paper analyses the practices of
economic policy in such developing coun-
tries as the NICs, Neru's India, Nasser's
Egypt, the radical and non-radical countries
of Africa, and the countries of Latin America
after World War II. The main conclusions
are as follows:
Development theories did not appear a
priori, in isolation from reality. Briefly it can
be said that the increased state contribution
was necessary in peripheral countries that
were short of capital and seeking new ways
of development. Within the scope available,
capital shortage and weakness of the entre-
preneurial stratum had to be offset by state
support for industrial development. There
was also a desire to compensate for the ine-
quality-producing, differentiating effects of
the international economy. Few people que-
ried this theory in the 1950s and 1960s,
which was supported by the international
institutions and the specialized agencies of
the UN, including the World Bank and the
IMF. In the developed capitalist countries,
too, increased state intervention on Keynes-
ian grounds was also on the agenda.
Except in the underdeveloped coun-
tries that took the state-socialist path
(China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba), the
state intervention stayed within the frames
of state capitalism and was designed, with
3some limitations, to stabilize the market
conditions. However, important differences
of emphasis occurred in the certain cases. It
is clear from the examples given that the
expressed or implicit aim of the intervention
in these countries, even initially, was to as-
sist in the emergence of a domestic stratum
of entrepreneurs, to encourage foreign
capital investment, and to promote integra-
tion into the world economy. In other
countries the subjective endeavours of po-
litical leaders were to reduce the inequality-
producing and income-withdrawing effects
of market forces and the international con-
ditions amongst them, and to ensure certain
basic social rights (subsistence, general edu-
cation, improved health care, etc.) by gov-
ernmental means. However, they had di-
minishing success in doing so.
Today, the effects of the economic
contribution of the state in most developing
countries, regardless of what politicians ini-
tially envisaged, have been changed by the
prevailing international economic and po-
litical power relations, as the liberal para-
digm has come to the fore and pressure has
built up from indebtedness. Within the
frames of adjustment and stabilization poli-
cies agreed with the IMF, the reduction of
the state economic contribution began in the
1980s, through privatization, deregulation
and the opening of domestic markets. This,
however, cannot be related to development
theory at all and even contradicts them. In
the eyes of development theorists, the liber-
alization and globalization of the last two
decades have exacerbated defencelessness
and helplessness in less developed periph-
eral and semi-peripheral countries, causing
a slowdown in economic growth, falls in per
capita income over vast regions, and greater
risk factors in the existing world.
The ‘political relevance’ of develop-
ment theory may have lessened under the
conditions of globalization, however, the
urgent issues discussed for decades within
the theory are coming to the fore at present-
day international economic and political
forums. They include the debate on the ine-
quality-inducing effects of globalization, the
profits of globalization, income concentra-
tion in general, the impoverishment of cer-
tain social strata and groups of countries,
and the weakening of the state.
The scepticism of the most radical de-
velopment theorists seems increasingly to
have been vindicated. The inequality-
inducing market conditions of the world
economy cannot be reformed under the
prevailing power relations and structures.
The peripheral countries cannot strengthen
the economic contribution of their state or
apply the more protectionist economic strat-
egy required for them to close up and also
manage the social injustice at home.
5INTRODUCTION*
Tamás Szentes calls development economics
‘differing opinions about the main factors
determining the development or underde-
velopment of certain countries or societies,
and concepts explaining the faster or slower
economic development of certain countries,
the international “development gap”, and
the unequal development of world society
and the world economy. These are generally
are of an interdisciplinary nature and con-
centrate, unlike “growth theories”, on qual-
ity changes instead of quantity changes’
(Szentes, 1995, pp. 744-5). The indirect
conclusion of all this is that development
economy is primarily the study of the eco-
nomic-development opportunities of less
developed countries, and secondarily their
social-development scope in a wider sense.
It deals with the roots of underdevelopment,
the development of such countries and
groups of countries, what factors lie behind
that development, the obstacles arising from
underdevelopment, and especially the world
economic conditions of underdevelopment
and the ways of overcoming it.
The contours of development eco-
nomics and development theories are not
easy to describe. The often-overlapping
opinions of countless politicians, ideologists,
theoretical economists and other specialists
could be listed here. This interweaving and
interrelation are among the factors making
the categorization of the various trends in
social scientific theory superficial and open
to criticism.
This paper examines development
theories under three heads. It considers es-
pecially the opinions dealing with the mar-
ket conditions and the economic role of the
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state and the relations they have with the
practice of economic policy. The author
considers examination of the last to have
fundamental importance.
Chapter 1 sums up the ideas of the
great figures in international literature.
Chapter 2 attempts to draw an albeit
sketchy picture of the relations that the
leaders, governments and ‘official’ ideolo-
gies of underdeveloped countries have
borne to the development concepts, in the
various geographical regions in previous
decades. Chapter 3 summarizes the exciting
Latin American experiences in more detail.
There the most consistent attempt was made
to apply one of the development theories.
Finally, Chapter 4 contains some re-
flections on the relevance of development
theory: their grounding, topicality and
adaptability.
1. THEORETICAL TRENDS IN
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Behind the evolution of the theory of devel-
opment economics lies the collapse of the
colonial system. Under what circumstances
did the question of development economics
arise most urgently? How can the underde-
veloped countries overcome their back-
wardness? Have they any historical chance
of succeeding at all?
Development theories were fed by two
perceptions. Perhaps the more definite of the
two was the perception that the position and
the development prospects of countries
other than the most developed countries,
especially the least developed ones, were
connected with the bias of their economies
towards the production of raw materials.
Such countries participated in the interna-
tional division of labour under world eco-
nomic conditions that favoured the devel-
oped countries, through ownership struc-
tures, market monopolies, technical depend-
ency, and the regulations and trends in in-
6ternational commerce and finance. Accord-
ing to Celso Furtado, ‘The theory of under-
development is in fact the theory of depend-
ency’ (Furtado, 1971). François Perroux un-
derlined the need to analyse the dependency
of economies, because ‘neo-classical theory
disregards automatically the relations be-
tween economies as units and the Keynesian
approximation disregards the possibilities of
the confrontation of political want domi-
nating certain national economies, so that
the equitable judicial role of world market
prices cannot be fully effective’ (Perroux,
1972, quoted in Szentes, 1976, pp. 12–13).
Development theories arose, expressly (in
the case of R. Stavenhagen, Osvaldo Sunkel
and Frank, for instance) or often implicitly
in dispute with so-called modernization
theories. The latter (from Emile Durkheim,
Hoselitz, Walt Rostow, Alexander Ger-
schenkron and many others) rested on a
theoretical base of classical economics and
linear development. They stated essentially
that the underdeveloped countries, though
lagging in time, follow the same course of
development as the most developed coun-
tries of today did in previous centuries.
The theoretical background for devel-
opment theory derived mainly from the
ideas of J. M. Keynes. Yet they cannot be
considered simply as a mechanical applica-
tion of this theoretical basis to the cases of
underdeveloped countries. The Keynesian
policy proposals referred to the period of the
Depression, suggesting that economic
growth is sustainable and unemployment
eliminable by increasing aggregate demand
(consumption and investment). The
Keynesian concept approached the problem
of macroeconomic equilibrium in the short
run, and as Perroux noted in the remark just
quoted, paid no attention to international
factors on the level of a model level. How-
ever, the question of development and im-
provement (‘modernization’) occurred for
underdeveloped regions as an epochal
problem, while economic dependency and
defencelessness against foreign countries
were present as an everyday limiting factor.
There were also influences from Marxism
and the practice of the socialist countries,
which are discussed later.
Development theories do not analyse
the situation of economies within a close
system. They usually abstain from mathe-
matical modelling. Instead, they examine
the national and international factors of the
economic processes together, in most cases
placing the latter to the fore, often rather
one-sidedly. An important aim is to analyse
economic processes in their social and po-
litical context.
The antecedents of this paper appear
in a study in which the author sought to
summarize the macroeconomic theories of
previous decades (Farkas, 1999). That in-
cluded a presentation of development-
theory opinions on the international econ-
omy, which is summarized in what follows.
There are three main trends in the theory of
development economics. The reform trend,
which is more closely connected with the
Keynesian background, emphasizes the way
international conditions generate inequality
and therefore need to be reformed in the
end. Based on experience, it rests on the
classical, liberal theory that business can
only be done if it brings advantages to both
partners. In opposition to the idea of proper
competition, the theorists of this trend
(Perroux, Furtado, Balogh) point to the ine-
quality between the partners and speak of a
backwash effect of international economic
conditions (Gunnar Myrdal). They note the
difference in bargaining power, the pressure
on export-sector wages, changes in the
terms of trade to the advantage of developed
countries, the international income drain
(Raul Prebisch, W.A. Lewis), the differenti-
ated consequences of technological adapta-
tion (Hans Singer), and the ‘perverse’ nature
of capital transfers counted with capital in-
comes, so that net flows are towards the de-
veloped countries (Hirschman, Prebisch).
These observations conclude in the theory of
an income drain through the international
trade (Prebisch), in emphasis on the fact
that the advances from productivity growth
are realized in the developed countries
(Lewis, Myrdal, Singer, Balogh, Prebisch),
and in the argument of the irreversible pro-
7cess in a cumulative equation (Myrdal, Ba-
logh).
To sum up, ‘It has been pointed out
that international trade, where conducted
between unequal partners, has a cumulative
effect of producing inequality’ (Szentes
1995, pp. 42-43. and 86). In connection
with the subject of this paper, the aspect to
focus on is the assertion that there are det-
rimental effects for less developed countries
where there is an international predomi-
nance of market conditions. It is therefore
argued that international economic relations
should be reformed in such a way as to im-
pede the mechanisms that give an advantage
to the developed countries. This school of
thought (Singer, Furtado) has been saying
the most explicitly and for longest – fifty
years now – that spontaneous market forces
need regulating at the level of the world
economy (Szentes, 1995, p. 252).
Some representatives of the New Left
habitually use Marxist rhetoric, but place
their arguments on a Keynesian basis, saying
that the inequality of international exchange
could be terminated by reducing wage dif-
ferentials between the developed and un-
derdeveloped world. (This obviously is a
Utopian aspiration, since the developed
countries need no option but to compete
with depressed real – productivity-related –
wages. The arguments of Imanuel Waller-
stein and Arghiri Emmanuel can be cited
here.)
Finally, the neo-Marxists emphasize
the inequality-producing effect of interna-
tional ownership conditions, the unequal
exchange, monopoly prices and other fac-
tors, but they do not consider that the exist-
ing international economic conditions can
simply be reformed. They argue that with-
out a fundamental change in these, includ-
ing a transformation of ownership condi-
tions, it will be impossible to make interna-
tional economic conditions more equitable.
At the same time, they speak of for ‘disen-
gagement by the underdeveloped countries
(Oscar Braun, Samir Amin, André Gunder,
Frank, Charles Bettelheim).
The second perception on a theoretical
level, on which development economics
drew as it became stronger after the Second
World War, was that economic maturity
and wealth are closely connected with in-
dustrialization and the development of the
related infrastructure and service sector.
This was first expounded comprehensively
by Kuznets and Maddison. Of course, the
idea came to the fore because ex-colonial
countries gaining their political independ-
ence wanted to decrease and combat their
lag behind the developed countries. These
theories received practical backing from the
rapid industrialization of Asian countries
that began in the 1950s and the industrial
development of the African countries in the
1960s. According to Prebisch, Singer,
Myrdal, Jan Tinbergen and others, economic
development and alleviating the inequality-
producing effects of international trade (e.g.
compensation for worsening terms of trade
suffered by raw-material exporters) are
preconditions for industrialization and a
structural development that transforms the
export-import structure. Advocates of this
trend, especially in Latin America, are also
called structuralists. (As early as 1945, Kurt
Mandelbaum was suggesting the transfor-
mation of agrarian economies into industrial
economies, in a study of the industrializa-
tion of backward regions that Singer later
described as a pioneer. See: Hettne, 1995, p.
273). They cite straitened resources as the
reason why an active state contribution re-
mains indispensable to structural transfor-
mation and industrialization. The various
trends in development economics agree that
a very strong and effective economic-policy
contribution by the state is needed. In this
respect, their opinions resemble those of the
expansion school and neo-Keynesianism,
but they call for even more active state in-
tervention – at least in less developed coun-
tries – to promote ‘long-lasting economic
growth and development… in legislation
and law enforcement, resources allocation,
income distribution and macroeconomic
stabilization. This means in practice that the
state must add to its monetary, fiscal, ex-
change-rate and welfare policies a deliber-
ate and consciously coordinated policy of
8economy development (including sectoral
and infrastructural policy) – and adequate
administrative, legal and economic means
for the realization of these policies’ (Hoós
1996, p. 10). Development theory’s ‘main
message was that development necessitated
plans, written by economists, and strong,
active governments to implement them’
(Hettne 1995, pp. 37–8). This very diverse
role for the state is primarily intended to
correct certain anomalies and spontaneities
in market conditions: ameliorating the for-
eign-economic and serious social effects of
income concentration, mobilizing the scarce
resources, notably investment, restraining
the dual structure of the economies, etc.
Lewis wrote in 1954, ‘The central
problem in the theory of economic devel-
opment is to understand the process by
which a community which was previously
saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent of its
national income or less, converts itself into
an economy where voluntary saving is run-
ning at about 12 to 15 per cent of its na-
tional income or more’ (Lewis, 1954, p.
155). The direct relation of development to
investment makes the development theory
cognate with the Keynesian approach that
crystallized into the Harrod–Domar Growth
Model and with the Marxist approach.
Myrdal was already drawing attention in
the 1960s to the fact that the state in the
underdeveloped countries was too soft and
weak to have the administrative capacity or
political and financial power to implement
development plans (Myrdal, 1968 and
1974).
Problems of the market and macro-
economic equilibrium take second place in
development theories to those of develop-
ment and growth. A. Hirschman suggested
‘unbalanced growth’, while Perroux em-
phasized the pull of the growth poles. Advo-
cates of development theory were reckoning
with the dual structure of economies and
the resulting imbalance over the longer
term. The subsequent chapters of this paper
analyse how the practical application of the
nationally based economic-policy proposals
offered by development theory gradually
became restricted by the conditions of glob-
alization. Singer admitted to some disap-
pointment with the results of industrializa-
tion in underdeveloped countries, which
created new, self-reinforcing conditions of
dependency and produced geographical
displacement of industrial plant, not real
development (Singer, 1971).
Like the Keynesian-based concepts in
general, development theory went on the
defensive in the 1970s. However, the period
of 15–20 years in which liberal-orthodox
development theories and the dependency
schools dominated have become up-to-date
again in some respects. After the 1980s,
which were a lost decade for most countries
in the developing world, the structuralist
description of the world system as a hierar-
chical structure came to the fore again.
However, the structuralism of the 1990s
differed from its forerunner in many re-
spects and became known as neo-
structuralism. This had been born in the
1970s, out of criticism of the economic and
social consequences of the stabilization poli-
cies of liberal monetarism. It originates from
structuralist roots, but integrates the con-
clusions of the dependency theories into its
scheme of opinions even more strongly. At
the same time, it has been affected to some
extent by liberal theories, insofar as it rejects
the idea of having an ‘overweight’ state. This
compromising and ‘balancing’ position be-
came general in the various trends of eco-
nomic literature after the 1980s, and still
more in the 1990s, which showed the con-
fusion and doubt prevalent in economic
theories (both Classical and Keynesian, see
Farkas, 1998). According to the neo-
structuralist view, the world economy forms
a structured whole whose elements are
marked by dependency relations of various
forms and strengths. Dependency is a
structural feature characterizing, to a vary-
ing extent, all the units of the world econ-
omy. D. Seers, for example, classes all the
countries in the world on this principle.
Neo-structuralism emphasizes inter-
national and intra-national power relations,
international and national institutional lim-
its, institutional and economic structural
rigidities, the need to reduce income differ-
9ences and poverty, and the creation of jobs
and the associated conditions of economic
growth.
On this ideological base, Sunkel and E.
Fuenzalida devised the theory of transna-
tional capitalist system, which on a global
level displays transnational structures (not
international ones any more), and by disin-
tegration on a national level. These proc-
esses are inevitable. Isolationism is not pos-
sible, so that Latin America has to be inte-
grated strongly into the world economy.
This calls for a ‘new interventionism’ that is
said to go beyond an extreme state role and
simplifies laissez-fair policy, as well. The
same kind of attempt at balance is reflected
in the way the neo-structuralists, under the
conditions of globalization, deem it neces-
sary to combine outward and inward-
looking economic policies and policy meas-
ures. (On neo-structuralism, see Hettne,
1995, pp. 135–8.)
The rapid growth in newly industrial-
izing Asian countries and recognition of the
state’s role in this contrasted with failures
and ambiguous results for liberal adjust-
ment programmes. By the late 1980s, this
had increased the interest in the possible
role of the state in economic development,
including industrial policy, as a means of
‘managing the deficiencies and failures of
the market’, easing social tensions and so
on. This shift of emphasis was dubbed the
‘counter-counterrevolution’ by P. Krugman
at the beginning of the 1990s (Krugman
1992). This revision of the state contribu-
tion did not only influence the certain
trends of development theories (like for in-
stance neo-structuralism discussed above),
but even the opinion of the leaders at the
World Bank.
2. THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD
The colonial system in Asia and Africa had
disintegrated by the middle of the 1960s.
The leaders and social scientists of the newly
independent countries were faced with the
question of how far it was possible to adapt
to their underdeveloped conditions the eco-
nomic theories and the economic policies
devised in the developed countries. The ini-
tial reaction was usually outright rejection
of these. It was not to be expected that the
leaders and theorists of a radical liberation
movement would use the ideas of their for-
mer oppressors as a starting point. In most
cases, they rejected them as ‘Western’ and
‘bourgeois’, and preferred radical schemes
for nationalization and transformation of
society. The American observer P.E. Sig-
mund wrote at that time, ‘The rejection of
capitalism and the favouring of socialism
originate in moral and economic reasons.
The developing countries think that the base
of their socialism is a society built on truth
rather than on profit, on rational planning
rather than on blind market activity, on
forced economic growth and industrializa-
tion rather than on raw material production
to the advantage of foreign companies.
These aims are accepted by almost all lead-
ers of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the
Near East’ (Sigmund 196?, p. 12).
At the beginning, everything seemed
very radical, but in the event, rejecting the
models of the developed countries and
pursuing a policy of isolationism proved to
be fuelled by rhetoric and a transitional
stage in most cases. The economies of the
underdeveloped countries were dominated
by market (pre-capitalist) conditions. Even
in those that nationalized foreign property
to some extent, there arose a layer of entre-
preneurs closely associated with strong po-
litical leaders and wealthy by local stan-
dards. The more up-to-date (in some cases
nationalized) manufacturing sectors of the
dual economies in underdeveloped coun-
tries continued to operate under the aegis of
multinationals based in the former imperial
power and under world market conditions.
In most post-colonial countries, members of
the managerial stratum that had attended
Western universities adapted to the new
conditions rapidly and their comprador
mentality became stronger, even at the ex-
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pense of their national interests. This proc-
ess began to accelerate in the mid-1960s,
when the growth and expanding political
power of the Soviet bloc, primarily the So-
viet Union, suffered a setback. The men who
had led the liberation struggles proved un-
able to adapt to the new conditions and
were gradually ousted. In most countries,
total rejection of Western economic theories
and radical concepts of socialism gave way
to calmer, more pragmatic ideas of in-
creased self-assistance, independent indus-
trialization and emphasis on cultural iden-
tity.
Most leaders and governments of the
Third World ceased to expend resources on
deepening and propagating the radical con-
cepts blended with socialist thoughts that
had dominated the early transitional years.
No independent economic trends of note
were established in most of the liberated
Asian and African countries, where univer-
sities and colleges mainly taught Western
economic theory, in departments often
headed by imported European professors.
The economic policy of the developing
countries essentially remained within the
frames of state capitalism, whose market
mechanisms tended to dominate their prac-
tice, even if their thinking had some anti-
market aspects. The conditions in their
country and the need to bolster their posi-
tion gave the leaders of developing countries
a predilection for development concepts that
incorporated the idea of a strong state and a
big state role. They were also influenced
strongly by the practice in the socialist bloc
countries. ‘The state capitalist strategy was
basically a response to the modernization
imperative (“industrialize or perish”); the
Soviet strategy could draw prestige from the
success of Soviet industrialization; while the
Keynesian strategy ensured the economists a
position as the high priests of growth. It is
therefore only logical that comparatively
few countries in the Third World were at-
tracted by the economic recommendations
implied in M. Friedman’s neo-liberalism, not
so much because the social consequences
were considered problematic, but rather be-
cause they were less consistent with the ex-
isting power structures in the Third World’
(Hettne, 1995, p. 38). For a long time,
Keynesian-based development concepts
dominated. Liberal models only came to the
fore later, in the 1970s, through mecha-
nisms imposed by globalization (e.g. debt
management) and pressure from the devel-
oped countries.
Of course, the account just given is
rather simplified. Most regions produced
theoretical or theory-simulating trends of
economic strategy that were independent or
home grown to some extent and influenced
by local conditions. However, these bore
rather specific relations to practice. They
could be called improvement conceptions
rather than concepts of development theory,
even though they often derived from insti-
tutional or university research. In other
words, what lay behind them in most cases
were governmental strategies and plans for
economic development. Some links are ap-
parent between these and the theoretical
trends discussed in the previous chapter, but
they were often indirect. In general, the
conditions and pragmatic considerations of
the interests of local elites were dominant,
not the theoretical bases. These remain im-
portant, even where the ideological and
theoretical background to the economic
strategy chosen was clearer and the views of
development theorists about a stronger state
sector and contribution had greater influ-
ence (e.g. in various concepts of socialism
and in Latin American ‘Cepalism’). In such
cases, the influence of theory was confined
to the government concepts. Even where a
relatively strong state sector had been estab-
lished, the conditions of the free market
(sometimes complemented or blended with
a natural economy) dominated everyday re-
ality and economic processes.
The paragraphs that follow set out to
identify the essence and specific character-
istics of certain regions and convey the as-
sessments of competent persons on the eco-
nomic role of the state there. The regions are
arranged from East to West.
The newly industrializing Asian
countries concentrated on local adaptation
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of the Japanese model and imitation strat-
egy. In this model, market forces are com-
plemented by formal and often informal
practices of resource allocation, relying on
negotiation between big companies and the
government sphere and on external market
defences (protectionism). However, this ap-
proach is not often seen in terms of devel-
opment theory. This is partly because there
is a specific model of developed Japan and
partly, if tacitly, because the geopolitical and
world strategic situation of these countries
(unlike that of the Asian socialist countries)
left them able to pursue market-protecting,
protectionist practices without eliciting
protests from developed capitalist countries.
Moreover the successes of the ‘tigers’, seen
through neo-liberal, pro-modernization
eyes, appears to resemble a laissez-fair de-
velopment strategy, relying on cheap labour
and assured comparative advantages, since
it is export oriented and confirms the Ros-
tow Model. (See, for instance, Balassa,
1971.) Except for the socialist (and perhaps
some ‘socialist-oriented’) countries, the
newly industrializing countries underwent
the strongest state intervention in free mar-
ket conditions, through regulation and
through control over capital processes and
capital reallocation. (The state-owned pro-
duction sector was inconsiderable, but the
state had a determining stake in the banking
sector in some cases.) Experts in those
countries lay emphasis on this to this day, as
one of the circumstances contributing to the
Asian crisis. The position of the state is ex-
plained in relation to Asian historical and
cultural roots and experiences and to the
position and scope of the region in the
world economy. Korean Professor Yeon-Ho
Lee (1998, p. 384) calls state intervention
the only possible means by which the devel-
oping countries of East Asia can manage
their economic growth and unstable market
conditions. This paper does not attempt to
study in depth the theoretical and actual
connections between the South-East Asian
models and development theory. However, it
is certain that the interaction between them
is more complex than is generally realized.
Furthermore, the experiences of these
countries have been cited with increasing
frequency by ‘developmentalists’ in recent
years.
India exemplifies well how terminol-
ogy and practice can diverge and the con-
cept of economy development become
adapted to the ideas and interests of the
economic and social elite. Jawaharial Nehru
said in 1946, ‘I am on the side of socialism
and I hope that India stands for socialism
and is marching towards the constitution of
a socialist state’ (Nehru, 1961, pp. 7-8.) In
1948, the Bombay Plan for industrial policy
envisaged nationalizing several basic indus-
tries within ten years, including manufac-
turing industry. The private sector was to be
limited to consumer-goods production and
agriculture. At the same time, there was
much discussion about nationalizing foreign
property and about radical land reform. In
the event, not much was done. Official
minds worked within a market model, al-
though it was adapted to the caste system
and emphasized the state’s economic contri-
bution. This is illustrated by a planning
document of 1956, which argues that a so-
cialistic society cannot be seen as a set, rigid
structure. It was neither necessary nor de-
sirable for the economy to become mono-
lithic. Extending the state sector would not
necessarily entail a concentration of deci-
sion-making rights or of power. (Second
Five Year Pla, 1956, pp. 24-25.) The social-
ist emphasis lay in raising living standards
and engendering fellow feeling in every
layer of society. The rhetoric and the essence
were at variance, because the outcome
could at best be called state capitalism
(combined with traditional conditions). No
wide-ranging nationalization was carried
out. Where nationalization occurred, full
compensation was given. The national eco-
nomic contribution of state-owned property
was 6–7 per cent and the contribution of the
state sector to industry remained around 10
per cent (Köves, 1966, pp. 192–3). As in
most developed countries, the state contri-
bution was high in the provision of invest-
ment resources, where it exceeded 50 per
cent. The planning was of indicative nature.
Only state-owned companies had compul-
sory plans to carry out. State-owned com-
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panies also maintained market relations
with each other. The state contribution to
the economy steadily weakened in subse-
quent decades. In the 1990s, an economic
policy of liberalization, supported by the
IMF and including privatization, came to the
fore. India, compared with other underde-
veloped countries, developed quite serious
and relatively independent economic re-
search in its universities and research insti-
tutes. This included microeconomic model-
ling of liberal aspects and Marxist trends,
which had a considerable effect on state
planning in some periods. Ceylon (Sri
Lanka) and pro-American Pakistan also ex-
perienced a shift of emphasis over the eco-
nomic role of the state. Indeed, the Indian
example just described can be considered
more or less typical for the Third World at
that time.
In the more radical Arab world of
Iraq, Syria and Nasser’s Egypt, and in some
other Arab countries, the state-owned sector
of industry stood in for the absent entrepre-
neurial stratum in industry. So 40–50 per
cent of industry was described as ‘socialist’,
or rather non-capitalist, by the politicians
and analysts concerned with it, although
this was rather questionable. The real ques-
tion in that period in the sixties was whether
these countries would move towards a so-
cialist type of development and which
power bloc they would join. Actually, de-
spite illusions and fears of the opposite,
there was no real domestic social basis for
the socialist path of development. The Arab
varieties of ‘socialism’ had no ambition to
limit commercial capital, which was strong
by Arab standards, or the market conditions
this required. Nasser made this clear in a
lecture to the Moslem Youth Association in
November 1963, although the socialist
countries did not want to listen at the time:
‘We are not building our socialism… di-
vorced from real conditions… We do not
believe in domination by one class. We want
democracy for the whole nation. We do not
believe using violent means to liquidate a
class. On the contrary, we believe in peace-
ful means of resolving conflicts’ (Nasser,
1963, pp. 354–8). (How similar this was to
the remarks in the Indian five-year plan!)
Egyptian Finance Minister El-Kaissouni, in
January 1964, called private property a cri-
terion for ‘economic democracy and a cen-
trally planned economy’ (el-Kaissouni,
1964). In the monarchies of the Gulf region,
the contribution of state property had been
even greater than in the group of countries
just mentioned, but it has always functioned
as the personal property of the ruling fam-
ily. Research into world economics takes
place at many universities in the Arab world
and there are specialist research institutes in
most countries. These are more or less sub-
servient to the prevailing governmental
policy.
Socialism was also discussed widely in
almost every African country, even those in
which a clear, hardly restricted market
economy was built. Some examples were
Nigeria’s ‘pragmatic socialism’, ‘socialism’
as interpreted by Tom Mboya, which her-
alded Western-oriented development in
Kenya, the ‘socialism’ of the Ivory Coast, and
the Senghor-type socialism of Senegal. The
theory of the last had an essentially racialist
basis of ‘negritude’. It idealized traditional
conditions and equated them with socialism,
something that several other African leaders
did as well. At the same time, Senghor did
not limit the activity of private capital in any
way. He himself told the magazine West Af-
rica in 1961, rather contradictorily, ‘We did
not prohibit by statute private capitalism,
even though it is a phenomenon alien to our
country’ (Csenahor, 1961). Then in 1963,
the same leader ordered the strikes and
demonstrations of city workers to be dis-
persed by the armed forces. The termino-
logical confusion is well represented by
Ivory Coast’s Minister of Finance, speaking
to the International Reporters’ Club in
Washington DC in September 1966. He
suggested that the Ivory Coast, of the many
African countries that had followed the
doctrine of African socialism, had shown
itself best at proving the success of the
capitalist system and free business activity
(Bedre, 1966). According to Nigerian ex-
President N. Azikiwe, in a 1963 interview in
Présence Africaine, their particular social-
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ism was a ‘welfare state’, not communism,
Marxism or Fabianism. It was the form best
adapted to our way of living. It was not ob-
structed by the fact that most of our people
believed in free commerce. This, however,
was not to be equated with profit at any
price’ (Azikiwe, 1963). In Tanzanian Presi-
dent Julius Nyerere’s ‘tribal socialism’ or
‘ujamaa (communal) socialism’, the ideali-
zation of tribal conditions was combined
with a kind of Christian ‘charitable’ social-
ism. He did not seriously consider limiting
business freedom either, arguing in his book
The Basis of African Socialism that the main
difference between socialism and capitalism
did not lie in the method of producing goods
but in the method of distributing them
(Nyerere, 1962). Nyerere’s conception did
not differ much from that of Tom Mboya,
Senghor or many other African leaders, who
idealized traditional tribal conditions and
the elements of solidarity in them, while
actually allowing the economic processes to
proceed spontaneously. This remains true
even though the capital-allocation role of
the state became relatively strong in Tanza-
nia, the state supported certain industrial-
izing efforts, and the solidarity of the ex-
tended family and tribe is strong in tradi-
tional societies. The World Bank in that pe-
riod also accepted the economic policy of
the state making an economic contribution,
which was normal development practice in
the Third World. In that case, why was Tan-
zania generally seen as a socialist-oriented
country? It was primarily because it estab-
lished better political, and in some respects
economic relations with the Soviet Union
than did the countries discussed in the pre-
vious paragraph. Nyerere spoke very posi-
tively of socialism and the economic and
social results achieved in the state-socialist
countries. Thus the actual economic orien-
tation and the world political alignment be-
came mixed in the categorization applied.
African socialism also had a radical
strand, present in Nkrumah-led Ghana be-
fore the coup d’état, in Sékou Touré’s
Guinea, in Mobido’s Mali, and later in An-
gola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Al-
geria. The typical voice was Nkrumah’s in
the 1960s, arguing that socialism postulates
common ownership of the means of pro-
duction, the land and the mineral wealth
and their use for the advantage of the people
(Nkrumeh, 196?). However, the transfor-
mation of the economy was not very radical
in any African country, with the possible
exception of Algeria. In the countries just
mentioned, some of the natural resources
underwent nominal nationalization, and so
did banking, insurance and public services
in some cases. In several African countries,
half of those employed outside agriculture
worked in the state sector, but their contri-
bution was fairly small when compared
with the total labour force. The main eco-
nomic-policy means used by the state was
economic planning. The free market was
only under constraint within a narrow
range, mainly in state-sector production and
state administration (e.g. the distribution of
basic materials according to plans and at
market prices, or payment of wages in kind
as well as cash). On the one hand, three-
fifths to four-fifths of the population pur-
sued subsistence farming. On the other, ex-
portable production was not nationalized
(bauxite in Guinea or petroleum in Angola)
or still run by its former owners and multi-
national companies even after formal na-
tionalization of the mines (e.g. in Zambia),
under service contracts. Foreign trade was
usually controlled by companies in the for-
mer imperial power. So the dominating
conditions were essentially those of a free
market. ‘Socialism’ only appeared in slightly
greater social sensitivity, in the development
of education, in economic planning, and in
some industrial and other investment by the
state. (These in some cases were prestige
projects aimed at strengthening national
feeling.)
Most of the more radical African
countries had gained their independence
after fierce and protracted struggles, gener-
ally led by intellectuals from none-too-
wealthy families, who had studied in Europe
and moved close to the European commu-
nist movements. These circumstances had
much to do with the radicalism of their
ideas. However, the political leaders who
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wished to limit the spontaneous operation of
the market did not possess a stable national
(class) base. Their support from the masses
resulted from successes they had achieved in
the independence struggle, after which it
gradually ebbed away. Their economic
power was necessarily limited under the
conditions of underdevelopment. Their po-
litical enemies gathered support from for-
eign companies and ex-colonials, while
their support came mainly from the socialist
countries (including supplies of arms, al-
though these usually had to be paid for).
Their radicalism necessarily decreased as
their domestic struggles became more in-
tense. The number of political about-turns
increased and the economic role of the state
was confined. All these developments were
joined by a surge of liberalism and an in-
crease in the foreign-policy and economic
pressure placed on their regimes.
The most independent economic ap-
proach of any African country was taken by
Algeria, where most of the radical ideas
were realized in practice over a period of
three decades. The background to this was
the war of independence, which spread over
the whole country, the relatively high level
of economic development achieved as an
overseas department of France, and the neo-
Marxist attitude of the wartime leaders, who
became the driving force in the initial pe-
riod of independence. The Algerian model of
‘socialism’ can be seen as a radical case of
autarky. The extent of nationalization was
greater than in any other African country,
or excluding the state-socialist countries,
anywhere else in the world. Algeria was
probably the only country where the state
was able to control the flow of goods and
assets to a considerable extent and defy
spontaneous market forces in many fields.
The ‘socially owned’ sector (central gov-
ernment, local government and the coop-
eratives) covered 80 per cent of the indus-
trial production, 60 per cent of agriculture
and logistics, and 40 per cent of the serv-
ices. However, these did not attain the ex-
tent reached in the socialist countries. Cer-
tain industries, such as light industry, re-
mained in private ownership. Households
were served mainly by private traders, who
even contributed to foreign trade. Private
capital did not feel especially constrained,
since light industry and trade are the tradi-
tional fields of Arab private enterprise. The
private firms were often owned by manag-
ers of the several thousand state-owned
companies. The real theoretical antecedents
to the Algerian model were Perroux’s
growth poles and Roger de Bernis’s industri-
alizing industrialization, rather than Marx-
ism. It is symptomatic that experts from the
World Bank assisted at the birth of Algeria’s
first long-term, 15-year plan of economic
development, alongside Soviet experts. Al-
though the Algerian experiment lasted
longer and went further, it too failed, like
the other experiments in more independent
national development.
This, as mentioned before, was a result
of internal shortcomings. These included
low levels of productivity and international
competitiveness, especially in ‘industrializ-
ing’, machine-making industries, opposition
from social strata who were becoming
richer, which opposed any curbs of market
forces, and passiveness or opposition from
ordinary people, due to the failures, diffi-
culties and income differences produced
under the prevailing conditions. Equally im-
portant were the changes in international
economic and political conditions and
power relations. T. Mkandawire, in his re-
cent analysis of the history and situation of
the African ‘developmental state’, pointed to
the ‘dramatic superiority of liberalism’ and
the globalization process, compelling gov-
ernments to pay homage to market forces
(Mkandawire, 1998, pp. 2–3). His ideas are
worth studying because the continent’s de-
fencelessness has left many African politi-
cians and experts wary of exposing their
opinions in public, although many share his
opinion. He highlights how the economic
policy of the state, in socialist or capitalist
countries, used to play an outstanding role
in mobilizing domestic resources. Savings
rates in African countries grew from 15 per
cent to 20–25 per cent by the beginning of
the 1980s, before sinking below 15 per cent
again by the early 1990s, as the power of
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the state became weaker. But according to
Mkandawire, the inward-looking economic
policy was never tantamount to isolationism.
Legal measures to protect industry were of-
ten taken at the specific request of foreign
investors. The external pressure, as the so-
called Berg Report (World Bank, 1981)
pointed out, demanded ‘repression’ of the
economic power of African states. This
emerged when the financial bases of the
state were shaken by international financial
processes and the state’s role underwent
‘drastic erosion’. However, after the unfa-
vourable experiences of the 1980s, the
1989 Africa report (World Bank, 1989)
again emphasized the necessary contribu-
tion of the state to the management of eco-
nomic development and social transforma-
tion. However, Mkandawire underlined, in
relation to these external expectations, that
the state would have to be autonomous –
isolated from its social roots and the servant
of external ‘agents of restraints’, through the
conditionality stipulations of the subven-
tions and technical cooperation received. He
added glumly that neither the laissez-faire
path nor the World Bank’s new idea of the
state was going to strengthen domestic en-
trepreneurship. He concludes from African
historical experience and the examples of
other, more successful economic developers
that most arguments suggest it is impossible
to launch an economy-developing state in
Africa. African experience tends to be mis-
understood mainly because the expression
‘weak state’, formerly used by Myrdal con-
cerning Asia, is taken to be confined to Af-
rica at present. Free scope is given to unlim-
ited foreign intervention and all hope that
local people may do something to further
development is lost (Mkandawire, 1998, pp.
5, 21, 25, 29, 32 and 33).
Finally, there was a major workshop
in Africa analysing the specialities of the
‘developing countries’, established at Dar-
es-Salaam University, with the help of the
British Institute of Development Studies
(Sussex), with noted foreign teachers as
participants. This operated until the end of
the 1970s. The questions and approaches it
took linked the workshop with the depend-
ency school, which had arisen from Latin
American roots. A similar direction was
taken by the research institute in Lagos
(IDEP), dominated by Samir Amin.
There was a special situation in Latin
America. The UN Latin American Economic
Committee (CEPAL), headed by Prebisch,
gave rise to a system of development and
modernization theory far more independent
than those of other regions of the Third
World of that time. It could be traced to the
Great Depression (or even to World War I),
when countries of the region chose an in-
ward-looking economic policy in reaction to
unfavourable foreign economic effects,
mounting worldwide protectionism and a
payments crisis. The ‘Cepalist’ economic
trend was a more focused manifestation of
the concept of self-sufficiency. By integrat-
ing the international structural dependency
of less developed countries integral, Cepal-
ism took an important step towards becom-
ing a relatively independent concept re-
flecting the special position of the group of
countries. It changed much over the decades
and was partly directed by the interests of
upper social strata and classes. It produced
several variants of economic policy, in the-
ory and practice, which are now, due to
economic pressures, open but defensive at
the same time. Its opinions confronted and
interfered with in various ways the mod-
ernization theories represented in and by
developed capitalist countries. These are
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
The dependency school, which has
many links with Cepalism, had two theoreti-
cal sources: the structuralist economic con-
cept and Marxism. Many representatives of
Cepalism and the dependency concept have
gained international fame and proved their
independence. Apart from Prebisch, they
include Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Fur-
tado, Sunkel, Dos Santos and others. Noted
development-theory experts of other conti-
nents have also been involved in the discus-
sion: Frank, Giovanni Arrighi, Emanuel Ar-
righi, Amin and others, like Tamás Szentes.
(See also Hettne, 1991.)
* * *
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Development theories did not appear a pri-
ori, in isolation from reality. Briefly it can be
said that the increased state contribution
was necessary in peripheral countries that
were short of capital and seeking new ways
of development. Within the scope available,
capital shortage and weakness of the entre-
preneurial stratum had to be offset by state
support for industrial development. There
was also a desire to compensate for the ine-
quality-producing, differentiating effects of
the international economy. Few people que-
ried this theory in the 1950s and 1960s,
which was supported by the international
institutions and the specialized agencies of
the UN, including the World Bank and the
IMF.1 In the developed capitalist countries,
too, increased state intervention on Keynes-
ian grounds was also on the agenda.
Except in the underdeveloped coun-
tries that took the state-socialist path
(China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba), the
state intervention stayed within the frames
of state capitalism and was designed, with
some limitations, to stabilize the market
conditions. However, important differences
of emphasis occurred in the certain cases. It
is clear from the examples given already
that the expressed or implicit aim of the in-
tervention in these countries, even initially,
was to assist in the emergence of a domestic
stratum of entrepreneurs, to encourage for-
eign capital investment, and to promote in-
tegration into the world economy. In other
countries the subjective endeavours of po-
litical leaders were to reduce the inequality-
producing and income-withdrawing effects
of market forces and the international con-
ditions amongst them, and to ensure certain
basic social rights (subsistence, general edu-
cation, improved health care, etc.) by gov-
ernmental means. However, they had di-
minishing success in doing so.
Today, the effects of the economic
contribution of the state in most developing
countries, regardless of what politicians ini-
                                                
1 See, for instance, the first UN publication on prob-
lems of development, Measures… (1951), among
whose authors were advocates of development the-
ory.
tially envisaged, have been changed by the
prevailing international economic and po-
litical power relations, as the liberal para-
digm has come to the fore and pressure has
built up from indebtedness. The beneficiary,
increasingly, has been capitalist, market
economic, world economic integration of
national economies. Even in countries for-
merly oriented towards socialism, the social
objectives have faded. (The extreme exam-
ple is Chile, where social and state-
economic reform that surpassed state capi-
talism was preceded by an authoritarian
coup d’état conducted with foreign assis-
tance. Algeria, Jamaica and Nicaragua were
not successful in their attempts at greater
economic independence and self-sufficiency
because of foreign economic dependence
and political intervention.) Within the
frames of adjustment and stabilization poli-
cies agreed with the IMF, the reduction of
the state economic contribution began in the
1980s, through privatization, deregulation
and the opening of domestic markets. This,
however, cannot be related to development
theory at all and even contradicts them. In
the eyes of development theorists, the liber-
alization and globalization of the last two
decades have exacerbated defencelessness
and helplessness in less developed periph-
eral and semi-peripheral countries, causing
a slowdown in economic growth, falls in per
capita income over vast regions, and greater
risk factors in the existing world.
3. LATIN AMERICAN MARKET
CONCEPTS AND THE ECONOMIC ROLE
OF THE STATE2
It is worth analysing the relations of the
Latin American development theories and
the political practice in more detail, as this is
the continent where the economic policies
                                                
2 I have relied strongly on the studies of Zoltán Kollár
(1992 and 1996) in this analysis of the Latin Ameri-
can theories and economic processes.
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have come closest to the theoretical con-
structs.
Latin American development theory
originated in the independence struggles
waged around the turn of the 20th century.
It reflects the emergence of an entrepreneu-
rial stratum, mainly of descendants of con-
quistadores and immigrants. This stratum
had an interest in the plantation economy
and raw-material production and strove to
get rid of the patronage of foreign capital.
Such endeavours were represented most
clearly between the two world wars by the
Peruvian Victor Raul de la Torre and his
‘revolutionary’ movement. According to a
statement in 1924, the aim was protection
‘through the anti-imperialist state, which
turns definitively to state capitalism by na-
tionalizing and progressively socializing the
sources of production, and thereby pre-
serving the middle classes from becoming
oriented towards big private capital, which
would mean a return to imperialism’ (Torre,
1924). The post-World War II Latin Ameri-
can development theories and economic po-
litical attempts also show signs of endeav-
ours by the entrepreneurial stratum to gain
more independence.
The world historical antecedents of
‘Cepalism’ were the anti-liberal, defensive
economic policies of Germany and the
United States in the 19th century. Prebisch
can be compared with Friedrich List, the
classical figure in the German economic
historical school. He already had the experi-
ences of Argentina in the 1930s behind him
when he said that countries at a lower level
of economic development had to be protec-
tionist until their industrial development
caught up with more developed nations. The
starting point for the structuralist approach
of Prebisch and CEPAL was the centre–pe-
riphery relation. Citing Latin American ex-
perience, they insisted that no favourable
structural changes were taking place, the
macroeconomic disequilibria were serious,
and so were the social consequences. They
saw as the primary cause their defenceless-
ness in the world economy (e.g. the wors-
ening of the exchange rate), from which
originated their idea of the necessity of pro-
tection and catching up. So Prebisch, like
List, did not reject outright the idea of
opening up to foreign markets. When pro-
tected industry had reached an adequate
level of development, a policy of free trade
might ensue.
According to this concept, it is neces-
sary to execute structural changes in the
economy and other fields of society, to im-
prove economic and social development and
international competitiveness. We can men-
tion here the debate between structuralists
and monetarists about the nature of infla-
tion. This emerged in the 1950s and contin-
ues to this day. The former attributed infla-
tion to the money supply and the latter to
the rigidity of the economy and its institu-
tions. This meant that structuralists advo-
cated improving the adaptability of the
economy as the main weapon against infla-
tion, which indicates that they were not op-
posed to the market as such and interpreted
state intervention within the market condi-
tions.
Thus structural development for
catching up necessitates a state contribution:
foreign economic regulation and market
protection on the one hand and subvention
of the industrial development process on the
other. The theoretical basis for the concept
of inward-looking economic development
(desarrollo hacia adentro) was devised in
the 1930s and applied in many Latin Ameri-
can countries. It was basically an adaptation
of Keynesian economics, but more than that
as well. As A. Gurrieri, an internationally
renowned analyst pointed out in the CEPAL
Review in April 1987, the scale of the state
intervention described by CEPAL was greater
than suggested by the Keynesian model,
since its targets were not confined to en-
suring total employment, stimulating eco-
nomic growth (production volume) or dis-
tributing incomes more equally (defining
distribution). It was also intended to re-
structure the economy to the advantage of
industrialization (what to produce) and to
promote utilization that considered the
quantity of the production factors available
(how to produce). It was to do all this while
the country was in a peripheral position in
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the world economy, which demanded
stricter control of foreign economic contacts
and the effects of them. CEPAL, he argued,
did not go on to pose the question of
whether Latin American countries could
really carry out these tasks successfully’
(Gurrieri, 1987). Indeed, the Latin Ameri-
can structuralist conception, having pre-
served its roots, changed greatly over the
decades.
In its original form, the theory simply
considered that Latin American develop-
ment had happened late. It was thought to
be possible to implant domestic industry
simply by expanding demand. Thereafter,
the countries of the region were expected to
be able to repeat the classic course of capi-
talist development, aided by strong isolation
and an inward-looking economic policy.
This was classical desarrollismo (classical
development doctrine). Policies of isolation-
ism and import substitution did indeed
bring considerable results during the Great
Depression and subsequent years.
Critical desarrollismo evolved after
World War II under the aegis of the CEPAL. It
had soon turned out that strict isolation was
impossible, because of the import demands,
export pressures and shortages of capital.
Partly because of the extreme income ine-
qualities, the domestic market was narrow.
Imports of production equipment increased
financial (and technological) dependency on
foreign countries. The disequilibrium in the
real economy, the import pressures (one
component of which was prestige con-
sumption by the rich) and the limited ex-
portability of the goods produced led to se-
vere foreign economic deficits. In this region
as well, it was typical for the entrepreneu-
rial stratum and the political elite that did
not own substantial property were suscepti-
ble to foreign pressure, due to their own
direct interests.3 Foreign capital, mainly
from North America, became very active.
                                                
3 A.G. Frank’s concept of a Lumpenbourgeoisie was
taken further by Cardoso, who used the expression
‘state bourgeoisie’, based on Latin American experi-
ence (Hettne, 1991, p. 33).
The main issue in the critical de-
sarrollismo known as CEPALISM for fifty years
has been the relation between the macro-
economic balance of the economy and de-
velopment, in other words, the relation be-
tween stabilization and ‘modernization’ and
harmonization of these. Actually, CEPALISM
has been searching for a middle way be-
tween two theoretical trends that represent
extreme values. One is orthodox liberal eco-
nomics, with its emphasis on stabilization.
The other is formation theory or develop-
ment theory, which puts modernization, or
in its radical form, social revolution to the
fore. According to a Hungarian commenta-
tor, ‘CEPALISM, in the centre, has not man-
aged to perform a theoretical synthesis of
stabilization and modernization, although it
has always made efforts in this direction.
CEPALISM has seen the possibility of creating
a synthesis in the structuralist position’
(Kollár, 1992, pp. 18–21).
It must not be imagined (influenced by
the stance of liberal orthodox economics,
which has gained hegemony in the last two
decades) that CEPALISM in the 1950s was an
extremist trend unacceptable to the central
countries in each of its elements and as a
whole. First, it stood on a basis of market
capitalism. Although there were cases of
nationalization, they were not extensive. On
the one hand, raw material resources had
long been state-owned. On the other, an in-
creasing state role in ownership and eco-
nomic management was a worldwide ten-
dency at the time. State capitalism ‘also had
a mediating function, being used by the state
to subsidize private capital’ (Kollár, 1996, p.
18). Moreover, critical desarrollismo cer-
tainly did not advocate absolute isolation
from the world economy. At most, it wanted
relative constraints to protect certain indus-
tries. Far from rejecting foreign capital, it
supported imports of this ‘short production
factor’ through state economic policy. It was
much less restrictive than the orthodox, in-
ward-looking economic concepts of earlier
periods. Its approach to development in-
cluded modernizing and extending export
sectors and more resolute selective opening
of markets. In practice, the means of state
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intervention went less and less beyond
Keynesian ideas, exceeding them only in
market protection. Last but not least, it was
generally accepted at that time for underde-
veloped countries basing their development
on industrialization to indulge in limited
market protection. As already mentioned,
this was backed even by the World Bank
until the 1960s.
Cepalism reflected the inconsistent
world economic positions of the Latin
American countries and less developed
countries in general, and its results were
inconsistent as well. Detailed analysis of this
cannot be included in this study. Apart from
producing certain positive symptoms of in-
dustrialization and development in the ex-
port sector, it did not lessen technical back-
wardness or foreign economic dependence.
The terms of trade worsened and the foreign
economic balances collapsed. Inflation in
most countries was high. Despite the limited
degree of introversion, the business cycle on
the continent was determined by develop-
ments in the US. The Latin American econ-
omy followed the North American into re-
cession at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s.
It became clear that dependency had not
decreased. Even the protected industries
were forced to cut back their production, for
instance due to weak domestic demand and
high production costs. Social discontent
swept over the continent.
The conditions of recession in the
early 1960s brought changes in the means
and concepts of development. Cuba moved
towards state-socialist development (domi-
nant state ownership, central economic
management and minimization of relations
with the capitalist world market). At this
juncture, the Latin American dependency
school gained strength as a theoretical
trend.
The Cepalist-structuralist school also
became more radical, at least among its
theorists, who demanded ever-stronger state
intervention in response to the short-term
imbalances that arose. The strategic element
behind this concept was the general, state-
backed economic expansion that would
ensue in the end. The so-called neo-
structuralists preceded thinkers in other
continents in opposing the orthodox eco-
nomic criteria (Ibid., pp. 36–7). After the
failure of such structuralist economic poli-
cies, which can also be seen as neo-
Keynesian, there naturally followed a rein-
forcement of the orthodox economic argu-
ments, supported by interests in North
America. Increasingly strident Neoclassical
voices and pressures demanded monetary
equilibrium, liberalization, retrenchment of
the state, and privatization. This was the
theoretical basis for introducing the early
IMF stabilization programmes in Argentina,
Chile, Peru and Columbia, then for stabili-
zation of the Brazilian economy from 1964
onwards, and after some years, the start of a
rather strangled Brazilian ‘economic mira-
cle’.
The main practical trend in Latin
America in the 1960s and 1970s was a re-
formed Cepalism,4 reflecting the explosive
situation and the way the structural, linear
connection of the traditional and modern
economic sectors was placed into the centre
of the renewed Cepalist program. The prime
area of modernization that had to be com-
pleted by the state through structural re-
forms covered dismantling the structural
bounds between sectors, transformation of
landed property, partial opening of markets
and increased export activities. However,
some import curbs were to be retained,
along with sector-specific inducements to
foreign investment and amelioration of
personal-income differences. The economic
role of the state was also adjusted. On the
one hand, ‘the state as a collective capitalist
institution played a central role’ in manag-
ing the crisis and easing social tensions, ‘be-
cause it had emerged that the power and
capabilities of private capital were inade-
quate to solve the problems’. On the other
hand, it was also clear that the spontaneous
activity of social actors had to be steered in
                                                
4 The US also supported the structuralist reforms,
including its industry-boosting priorities, through
the Association for Progress Programme, largely out
of fear of social unrest.
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the right direction, although CEPAL was still
emphasizing the importance of economic
planning (Ibid., p. 43). CEPAL declared an
anti-inflationary policy centred on control
of supply, since it emphasized the structural
elements in the depreciation of the value of
money. There was concurrent emphasis on
improving the flexibility of the economy, to
contain the effects of inflation. The new
trend proved to be reformist also in bringing
reform of the state budget into its pro-
gramme. By that time, the importance of
stabilization was being emphasized more,
but structural reforms were considered very
important to it. So the modernization of fis-
cal and monetarist policy became part of the
programme, but as an element subordinate
to the structural changes. As Kollár points
out (1992, p. 42), ‘The modernizing and the
stabilizing concepts were strongly entwined
in the 1960s, with modernization domi-
nant.’
The liberal and the modified struc-
turalist policies applied in the 1960s, sup-
ported by favourable trends in the world
economy, stabilized the region’s economy,
bringing rapid GDP growth in the late
1960s to late 1970s. At this stage, economic
growth was based primarily on expanding
the domestic market and consumption, with
contributions from the foreign investment.
Multinationals concentrated on domestic
markets, but they began transplanting some
of their production capacity, especially pol-
lutant or labour-intensive processes, to un-
derdeveloped regions, including Latin
America. The period of economic prosperity
was moderated, but not terminated by the
oil-price explosion and world economic re-
cession of 1974–5. The policy of state inter-
ventionism ensured that state expenditure
remained buoyant, with decreasing reve-
nues being offset by printing money. In the
second part of the 1970s, the Latin Ameri-
can countries again faced the payment diffi-
culties and accelerating inflation typical of
the region.
The crisis of structuralism is dated by
André Gundar Frank to the 1970s, whose
remarks contain many relevant ideas, al-
though they are one-sided and lacking in
subtlety at times. He emphasizes the useful-
ness of structuralism, but notes that depend-
ence and new independence theories of de-
velopment seems to have been undermined
as guides to policy by the world crisis of the
1970s. The Achilles’ heel of these concepts
of dependence, he argues, was the implicit
and sometimes explicit notion of some kind
of separate alternative available to the Third
World. Frank asserts that this never existed,
either as a non-capitalist path or, it now
emerges, through so-called socialist revolu-
tions. He states that the new crisis of real
world development renders such partial de-
velopment and parochial dependence theo-
ries and policy solutions invalid and inap-
plicable (Frank 1981, p. 27). Thus in prac-
tice, there never has been a possibility of de-
vising a more independent economic policy,
he suggests. In fact, the example of Latin
America (and of the socialist and the newly
industrializing countries) proves that con-
scious government efforts at development
achieved some albeit limited results in cer-
tain periods, when world economic condi-
tions were favourable. That applies even
though the Latin American countries did not
take the difficulties of their conflict-ridden
peripheral or semi-peripheral situation seri-
ously enough in the 1970s, or adapt conse-
quentially enough to unfavourable changes
in the world economy.
The toned-down structuralist eco-
nomic policies applied in this period and the
way they were implemented were not radi-
cal enough to end the duality of their
economies, the backwardness of the coun-
tryside and the extreme income differences.
They concentrated on rapid GDP growth
supported by rapidly increasing external
indebtedness and accelerating inflation.
However, it must be stressed again that the
developed countries and the international
financial institutions supported and even
insisted on this economic strategy in the
1970s, at least on maintaining growth and
foreign borrowing. The gathering tensions
were obscured by relatively favourable
growth rates. The CEPAL development pro-
gramme for the 1980s (passed at its 1979
congress in Bolivia) did not include any
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conceptually new elements. It focused on
sustaining growth and ameliorating biases
in foreign economic dependence. Neglecting
the problems proved to be a grave mistake.
Open crisis arrived when Mexico defaulted
in 1982. Fulfilment of international pay-
ment obligations, macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and curbs on the mounting inflation
called for policy solutions that would bring
rapid success. This effectively ruled out a
Cepalist, structuralist policy of accelerating
out of danger and concentrating on long-
term structural transformations. Latin
American crisis management in the 1980s
followed orthodox economic policies cen-
tred on improving the balance of payment.
These were supported, and in the case of
debt relief demanded by creditors and the
IMF, according to the so-called heterodox
economic concept (concentrating on mone-
tarist reform and anti-inflation policy).5
There is no Chinese wall between the two
solutions, and in effect, several combina-
tions of them were applied.6 At the same
time, the heterodox theory was to some ex-
tent open to the structuralist development
conception, although this was not realized
in the short-term crisis-management pro-
grammes. On the other hand, the heterodox
concepts also emphasize the need for a
strong state to implement the adjustment
(measures such as price and wage stops),
which do not support liberalization, or only
do so partly.7
                                                
5 Orthodox economic policy was typical in Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Dominica, Columbia, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay and Venezuela. Heterodoxy was found
mainly in Argentina and Brazil, but from the mid-
1980s onwards, there were experiments also in Bo-
livia, Columbia, Peru and Venezuela. Effects can be
discerned in several countries, even Chile.
6 In addition, there were successive orthodox, struc-
turalist and structuralist-Cepalist governmental pro-
grammes in the Latin American countries, the last
reappearing at the end of the decade.
7 Orthodox economic policy also postulates a strong
state, although its devotees may deny this even
among themselves. On the one hand, monetarist
tightness and demand constraints manifest strong
governmental demand. On the other, suppression of
social opposition often calls for a state that looks
strong and uses force occasionally. The examples are
not confined to Chile, which had a US-backed fas-
cist-like regime for almost 20 years. ‘Tough’ regimes
In the new phase, liberalization and
de-etatization became essential policy ele-
ments, especially in countries pursuing or-
thodox economic policies. State investment
and social expenditure were considerably
reduced, which reduced demand and the
market. However, although privatization
was urged by the IMF, it was of no great
extent. (At the end of the 1970s, the contri-
bution of the state-owned corporate sector
in Latin America was between a fifth and a
third of the total.) There was a continuing
budgetary need for export earnings from the
state-owned raw-material industries (such
as copper in Chile). The demand from weak
private capital was small, especially for low-
profit state-owned companies, and trans-
ferring raw-material wealth into foreign
property was still seen as a limitation on
economic independence. In the early 1980s,
state investment decreased rapidly, but no
substitute resources emerged, the invest-
ment and economic-development spending
of the budget rapidly again in the second
half of the decade (Kollár, 1996, pp. 57 and
58).
The economic situations on the conti-
nent were not improved by the ensuing eco-
nomic policies of shock therapy. Growth
ceased, economies destabilized, net capital
withdrawal became typical, and social ten-
sions mounted. According to Kollár, the
foremost Hungarian expert on the Latin
American economy, ‘In the 1980s … it be-
came clear that the neo-liberal, monetarist
paradigms of stabilization do not obviously
serve the interests of the Latin American
economy. However, it emerged eventually
that the heterodox, autonomy-expressing
theses also describe the imbalances of the
Latin American economy and effect mecha-
nisms of the therapy starting from the de-
veloped market economy. It can be stated
that other trends in economics (such as
structuralism) simply apply the operation of
the developed economies (or more precisely
developed market conditions) and at best
deduce from it the operational regularities
                                                                          
also administered shock therapy in other Latin
American countries in the 1980s.
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of less developed economies. At least struc-
turalism, despite many contradictions, can
be said to try to describe the “bridge” be-
tween the less developed and the developed
economic conditions in some way, and does
not rely merely on a kind of economic
automatism’ (Ibid., pp. 111–12).
Through Cepalist eyes, the stabilizing
economic policies, especially the shock
therapies, were one-dimensional, concen-
trating only on effects at the expense of
causes. However, the failure of the orthodox
and heterodox programmes again induced
attempts in some countries8 to devise struc-
turalist development programmes in the
mid-1980s. The heterodox and orthodox
economic policies were blended and spiced
with structuralist elements, but the positions
of the continent as a whole did not improve.
Only with the balance of payment was there
partial success.
Again owing to the failures of the or-
thodox and heterodox efforts, CEPAL in the
1980s maintained the core of its develop-
ment-theory concept, arguing that struc-
tural reforms of the domestic and the inter-
national economy were needed. It contin-
ued, or would have continued to favour
economic growth and structural improve-
ment of the economy, but everyday eco-
nomic pressures led to increasing acknow-
ledgement of the need to stabilize the econ-
omy in the short run. At the CEPAL congress
in 1986, Prebisch in his last speech spoke of
the need to combine policies of import sub-
stitution and export orientation. It is worth
noting that he stood for selective protec-
tionist policies, even when one-sided import
substitution had proved impossible for a
long time and world economic pressures
had forced Latin American countries to open
and liberalize more strongly. He still consid-
ered there was an irresolvable contradiction
between the conditions in the continent
(and the underdeveloped countries in gen-
eral) and the position of the world’s eco-
nomic structures.
                                                
8 Uruguay, Nicaragua, Peru, and Trinidad and To-
bago.
After the liberal experiments had
ended in contrary or weak results and
heightened the social problems, intermedi-
ate, ostensibly balanced opinions were
formed in Latin America about the role of
the state, also reflecting the ideological and
practical offensive of liberal monetarism.
Enrique Iglesias wrote that the temptations
of the populists and the laissez-faire state
had to be combated and a state created that
combined economic efficiency with social
balance (Iglesias, 1985, p. 72).
CEPAL laid increasing emphasis in its
documents in the 1980s on the demand for
debt relief. Rightly, in the author’s opinion,
it took the processes of the world economy
to be the main culprit. The economic phi-
losophy of CEPAL had always included efforts
and suggestions about reforming the struc-
ture of the world economy. Now, unsur-
prisingly, the debt problem was placed at
the centre of these. CEPAL also forced partial
modification of the debt-management no-
tions of the IMF. In the light of the Baker
Plan of 1985 and the Brady Plan for 1989,
increasing numbers of countries coupled
stabilization and IMF-interpreted structural
adjustment with certain incentives to
growth and a stronger welfare net, was
greatly supported by the debt relief.
Since the condition for the IMF-
conducted debt relief was to apply partially
modified orthodox economic policies that
included heterodox and structuralist ele-
ments, these were adapted again in most
Latin American countries at the end of the
decade. After a ‘lost decade’ of wriggling
and writhing, the adoption of orthodox
models coupled with debt relief saved the
continent from total collapse and perhaps a
social explosion at the end of the 1980s, al-
lowing Latin America to gain some respite at
the beginning of the 1990s. The early 1990s
indeed brought some prosperity to Latin
America. The recession in the developed
countries at the beginning of the decade
produced an increased capital inflow. This
along with debt reliefs and some liberaliza-
tion-induced improvement in competitive-
ness contributed to the prosperity. Owing to
the liberal economic policies that had
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strengthened at the end of the 1980s, the
economic contribution of the state in Latin
America rapidly weakened in the 1990s.
Privatization of state-owned companies and
banks reduced the state’s ability to exercise
economic control through institutional
structures for planning. Nonetheless, the
situation remained fragile. The international
financial crisis and capital speculation that
began at the beginning of the 1990s shook
Mexico in 1995. The Brazilian crisis started
in the summer of 1998 and worsened early
in 1999, with knock-on effects across the
continent. These do not seem to be soluble
even with external help, so that the conti-
nent today faces a severe economic reces-
sion. In addition, the already extreme social
and income differences have increased fur-
ther. It seems that liberalization and an or-
thodox economic policy of relegating the
economic and social role of the state cannot
stabilize the position of Latin America in the
long term.
The debate on the alternatives for
Latin American development policy contin-
ued at the beginning of the 1990s under
conditions of relative prosperity. One view
was the liberal one, named the ‘Washington
view by L.C. Bresser Pereira, a former Bra-
zilian minister of finance, which continued
to urge the minimization of the state. Op-
posed to this, Pereira concluded from spe-
cific Latin American experiences and op-
portunities, was the social democratic or
‘crisis-of-the-state’ approach taken by most
Latin American economists, which balanced
one with the other, rather as Iglesias had
done a decade earlier. As Pereira wrote,
‘Now, when the crisis of the 1980s is termi-
nating, a new synthesis is taking shape…
The crisis-of-the-state approach originates
directly from the new dependency theory,
but it takes the market-oriented reforms and
dual coordination of the market-state a step
forward. It acknowledges that populist fiscal
disorder is a real problem… It acknowl-
edges that the state has grown too big… Pri-
vatization may also contribute to the solu-
tion of the fiscal crisis of the state… The
economy must become strongly market-
oriented… However, economic coordination
must be composite. The allocation of the
resources must be entrusted to the market,
but reform of it must be left to the state…
The crisis is a consequence of the great
weakness of the state, not of its strength… of
the fact that the state has become unable to
complement the market in the way it
should… For this reason, the structural re-
forms should not be targeted at a “minimal
state”, but at strengthening the state, and
elaborating a new development strategy in
accordance with the new and limited forms
of state intervention.’ However, the budget-
ary deficits that had weakened the state
were not primarily connected with lack of
fiscal discipline, according to Pereira. They
arose out of world economic effects and in-
debtedness, which swelled the interest bur-
den of the state budget, and because the rich
traditionally paid very little tax. ‘In this I see
the autocratic and partly democratic nature
of the Latin American state, due to the state’s
subordination to the rich’ (Pereira, 1995,
pp. 542–4).
With stronger disadvantageous world
economic effects, deepening social prob-
lems, the scope for the rich to assert their
interests, liberal pressure from creditor
countries, and inconsistencies in the model
described (small, but strong state being
more liberal and stricter at the same time),
there seems little chance of realizing what
Pereira describes, although it reflects a fairly
general way of thinking.
4. THE RELEVANCE OF DEVELOPMENT
THEORY
Björn Hettne, an acknowledged expert on
development theory, points out, ‘The rele-
vance of a discipline is of course partly de-
pendent on its quality (theoretical rele-
vance), but also on its relations with the
centres of power (policy relevance). In the
latter sense development studies have been
increasingly marginalized due to the intel-
lectual and political changes in the real
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world referred to above, although it is ques-
tionable whether it ever had a very strong
position in political terms. Anyhow, the
marginalization continues and development
studies may end up as a fighting church.’
He, however, completed this pessimistic
analysis by saying, ‘Development theory
may not always have come up with the
correct solution on the policy level, but on
the other hand, the problems identified and
analysed have not disappeared either. In-
stead, new problems have been added’
(Hettne, 1995, p. 11).
The author agrees that development
theory identify real conflicts in the real eco-
nomic and wide-ranging social conditions.
They include the mechanisms of economic
imbalance and income shifts, and those of
international economic conditions. Then
there is the dependence and defencelessness
of the peripheral and semi-peripheral
countries, and in general, the limits of free
market conditions in extending consump-
tion, promoting economic development and
applying social justice. Most of the conclu-
sions reached by development economists
were not radical (except for the neo-
Marxists).
The examples of India, Egypt, Black
Africa and Latin America show that when
development theories were used in any form
as an ideological and theoretical basis for
modifying reality, domestic and even for-
eign entrepreneurial practice and market
conditions were not generally constrained to
any considerable extent, even in so-called
socialist-oriented countries. The most fre-
quent form of constraint was a ban on pri-
vate capital entering certain sectors, usually
ones in which domestic entrepreneurs
showed little interest, for want of capital
and traditions. (For example, even where
raw material production was formally na-
tionalized, in most cases in the 1960s, for-
mer foreign and multinational owners re-
ceived rent incomes continually, similar in
amount to the profits they had earned,
through supplier contracts and distribution
on world markets.) Although there were
also radical trends, especially in the begin-
ning, in the 1950s and the 1960s, develop-
ment theories and primarily the economic
policies referring to them essentially and
basically represented the interests of the
domestic entrepreneurial strata. The radical
conditions in which these strata evolved and
their desire to obtain greater power meant
that they also contained populist elements,
including even socialistic ideas in some
cases. Their radical rhetoric was often the
consequence of their effort to make use of
the conflict between the developed capitalist
and the state-socialist countries to squeeze
maximum support out of both camps.
In the world economic and political
situation after World War II, development
theory was more or less relevant in practical
terms, as well. It still seemed feasible then
that the less developed countries would
move towards industrialization, vindicating
the interests of their national bourgeoisie.
They seemed to have the potential to do this
through a selective-contriving connection
with the world economy and the world
market, with limited market protection,
with various measures to assist import sub-
stitution, and by strengthening the role of
the state as an organizer and resource-
concentrator for the economy. Indeed, some
limited successes were achieved in this re-
spect in the 1950s and 1960s.
However, the countries that could be
related directly or indirectly to development
theory were not the ones that made most
progress with industrialization. That title
belongs to the groups following two other
models: the state-socialist countries (the
European ones up to the 1970s, but China
up to the present day), and the newly in-
dustrializing Asian countries. In the author’s
opinion, this is easily understood, since the
two latter were sheltered from external
competition by market protection, while the
contribution of the state became even
greater in resource concentration, financing
the infrastructure, education and training,
technical development and modification of
economic processes. (Of course, there were
great differences between the two groups,
since one was dominated by state ownership
and the other by corporate private owner-
ship.) There is no sharp dividing line be-
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tween the development strategies realized by
these two groups and by other less devel-
oped countries, but the former were, in their
own ways, more consistent and resolute in
offsetting spontaneous world economic pro-
cesses.9 Certain historical preliminaries and
conditions made the relatively ‘separate
way’ of development more feasible for them
than for other regions.
Meanwhile, globalization conducted
by the multinational corporations and fi-
nancial groups evolved with increasing
speed. Goods, services, and above all, capital
flows encountered ever fewer obstacles be-
tween countries and regions. For this reason,
the external conditions for realizing more
specific and more or less protectionist eco-
nomic policies steadily deteriorated. They
worsened because the markets became more
open and domestic goods produced in a less
productive way proved uncompetitive
against imports from the developed coun-
tries. (Capital strength and the demonstra-
tive effect important in marketing also con-
tributed, as did, for instance, the general in-
debtedness that developed in the less devel-
oped countries.)
Under the conditions of globalization,
the chances of pursuing more independent,
inward-looking policies were exhausted
first in countries with weakly developed
economies and industries, mainly because of
their indebtedness. These are the countries
generally associated with development
theories in some way. Thus the continents of
Africa and Latin America stagnated in the
1980s. Nor were the European socialist
countries able to match the international
competition in productivity, for other, com-
plicated sets of reasons. That failure was
among the direct antecedents and reasons
for their transition to capitalism and reinte-
gration into the world economy in the early
1990s. The newly industrializing countries,
on the other hand, managed to hold out un-
til the mid-1980s. Then, as they approached
the level of the most developed countries,
                                                
9 In this respect, the state-socialist and the newly in-
dustrializing countries can be said to have been the
most radical implementers of development theory.
the reserves inherent in their model ran out
at the same time as their relatively favoured
position (market protection and a strong
state) became increasingly irksome to the
repositories of globalization, the most devel-
oped countries. Primarily through pressure
from the United States, their integration into
the system of liberalized ‘rules of the game’
was placed on the agenda, by exploiting the
financial crisis they were undergoing.
It is worth referring back here to lines
by Björn Hettne cited earlier. Although the
‘political relevance’ of development theory
may have lessened under the conditions of
globalization, the urgent issues discussed for
decades within the theory are coming to the
fore at present-day international economic
and political forums. They include the de-
bate on the inequality-inducing effects of
globalization, the profits of globalization,
income concentration in general, the im-
poverishment of certain social strata and
groups of countries, and the weakening of
the state. This applies to the structuralist
trend, including the ‘new interventionism of
Sunkel and Fuenzalida, to the previously
discussed ‘crisis-of-the-state’ concept of the
former finance minister, and to Mkan-
dawire’s ideas about Africa. These views are
mutually consistent. On the one hand, they
indicate that the ‘weakening’ of the state in
the developing countries was primarily the
consequence of world economic effects de-
rived from globalization and disadvanta-
geous to the peripheries. They also empha-
size that with peripheral and semi-
peripheral countries, an enhanced state
contribution to the economy is essential,
even under market conditions. Finally,
aware of the real power relations, they ac-
cept a ‘limited’ and ‘non-excessive’ eco-
nomic position for the state, which ‘exceeds
the simplified laissez-faire politics’. How-
ever, international conditions in fact do not
favour the concept of a state of medium
strength either. Some leaders of the interna-
tional financial institutions and other bod-
ies, noting the heightened economic and so-
cial conflicts, almost incline theoretically to
reinforce certain functions of the state
(control of capital flows, social contribution,
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etc.). In reality, however, they generally
stick to their monetarist concepts of liberali-
zation. (This emerges when the conditions
for debt management are discussed.)10
Can it therefore be said that in aban-
doning development theory and practice,
the basic problem has not been the devel-
opment theories, but the constraint mecha-
nisms of practice and reality? Or does the
problem lie in the globalization of the world
economy, since the narrow (profit) interests
of multinational capital are being vindicated
and brush aside everything in its path, such
as the development endeavours of the pe-
ripheries and the more protectionist eco-
nomic policies that serve those efforts? The
scepticism of the most radical development
theorists seems increasingly to have been
vindicated. The inequality-inducing market
conditions of the world economy cannot be
reformed under the prevailing power rela-
tions and structures. The peripheral coun-
tries cannot strengthen the economic con-
tribution of their state or apply the more
protectionist economic strategy required for
them to close up and also manage the social
injustice at home.
                                                
10 Concessions are only made where social tensions
have grown very strong, as in Algeria or Russia.
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